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Abstract
In a repeated interaction between and a principal and two agents with inter-agents ex-
ternalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the
organization is limited to the ﬁrst period and across agents.
1 Introduction
In multi unit organizations, with externalities (the choices made by one unit aﬀect the proﬁt of
the others), two key factors will drive the task allocation problem: externalities and asymmetric
information. In the absence of externalities, there is no need to coordinate agents’ choices and
proﬁt is maximized in a fully decentralized structure where the agents have all the power. In
the absence of asymmetric information, there is no reason to delegate and proﬁt is maximized
in a centralized organization where the principal keeps all the power. In an organization where
there are both externalities and asymmetric information, beneﬁts and costs are associated with
delegation.
In a single period interaction, delegation is beneﬁcial because the decider has superior in-
formation (Dessein, 2002). With repeated interaction, delegation has an additional beneﬁt: the
principal can improve her knowledge of the agents’ information by observing their past decisions
(Gautier and Paolini, 2007). Delegation is a learning process: when the agent uses his private
information to make better decision, the principal revises her beliefs by observing the agent’s
choice and she can improve her decisions.
We model a two-period interaction between one principal supervising two agents (units). At
each period, a project must be implemented in each unit. At time zero, the principal chooses the
process of decision-making for the following periods. Projects are transferable control actions
(Aghion et al., 2002): projects cannot be contracted out but control is contractible. Each agent
has a piece of private information and he exerts an externality on the other. The question, in
this context, is which decisions should be decentralized and when?
In line with Gautier and Paolini (2007), we show that optimal decentralization within the
organization is limited to the ﬁrst period. Being a learning process, delegation is unnecessary
when the non-informed party has acquired the information. Delegation is also limited across
agents. With correlated information, the principal acquire information that is partially redun-
dant when she delegates to both agents. Hence, symmetric agents can be treated asymmetrically
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1within the organization. An agent receives control over the ﬁrst project while the other does
not. Necessary conditions for this asymmetric treatment of agents are repeated interaction and
correlation between information.
2 The Model
There are three players, the principal and two agents, and two periods. Each period sees a
project implemented in both units. Before the ﬁrst period, the principal decides who will have
the power to choose the project (dl
t) in periods t = 1,2 in unit l = A,B.
Each agent l has private information represented by a state parameter θl drawn out of
a set Θ = {θ1,θ2} with θ1 < θ2 and ∆θ= θ2 − θ1. Each agent knows the true realization
of θ while the principal only knows the prior distribution. The distribution of (θA,θB) over
Θ×Θ is represented by a joint probability distribution {v11,v12,v21,v22} where vij = prob(θA =
θi,θB = θj). Correlation can be measured by ρ = |v11v22 − v12v21|. To simplify, we assume
that: v11 = v22 = vii and v12 = v21 = vij. Then, ρ=|vii − 1
4| and it takes a value between 0
(independence) and 1
4 (perfect correlation).
The projects diﬀer in just one dimension and there is a continuum of possible decisions: dl
t ∈
(0,+∞).
Each unit is a proﬁt center. Depending on θl, there is one project maximizing proﬁt in unit
l. There are externalities between the two units. The agents maximize their unit’s proﬁt, while














with l 6= k. Πl is maximized for dl
t = αl+θl. Total proﬁt ΠA+ΠB is maximized for dl
t = αl+θl−γ.
3 Decisions of the principal and the agents
Each decision dl
t is made by the person to whom the principal has allocated the right to decide.
When the principal must decide on a project dl
t, her decision depends on the information she
has. Let us represent her information by a distribution of beliefs ηij over Θ × Θ. The decision
dl
t that maximizes total proﬁt is:
dl
t = αl + E(θl | ηij) − γ,
where E(θl | ηij) denotes the expected value of θl conditional on beliefs ηij.
When agent l must decide on a project dl
t, he must take into account that the principal will
revise her beliefs after observing dl
t. This changes the agents’ proﬁt if the principal can make a
decision after the agent i.e. only if dl
1 is delegated and dA
2 or dB
2 is not. If the principal cannot use
the agent’s information, the agent chooses his preferred project dl
t = (αl+θl). In all other cases,
the agents and the principal play a signaling game and we must search for equilibria. Usually,
signaling games have multiple equilibria. We use Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion (IC)
to reﬁne the set of equilibria. We can establish that:
Proposition 1 Under delegation of dl
1, the only equilibrium that survives IC is the least costly
separating (LCS) equilibrium.1
1The Riley (1979) outcome.
2Proof. See appendix.
Proposition ?? implies that the agents disclose their private information by taking a state
contingent decision when they receive control at period 1. Hence, if the principal delegates dl
1,
she learns θl and improve her knowledge of θk. Second period decisions are then based on a
more accurate information.
Corollary 2 If ∆θ2 ≥ γ2, the LCS equilibrium is dl
1(θ) = αl + θl.
4 Optimal organization
Given that there is an externality between the two units, any form of delegation has a cost for
the principal because there is no coordination in the project choices. Nevertheless, delegation
beneﬁts the principal because (i) the decisions of the agents are based on better information than
those of the principal and (ii) the principal improves her knowledge of the state parameter after
observing delegated decisions. In line with that, delegation of second period decisions should
never occur.2
Starting from a fully centralized organization, let us deﬁne the marginal beneﬁt of delegating
ﬁrst period projects to the agents. Delegating one project amounts to a change of total proﬁt
equals to Mb(1) = −γ2+ 1
2(1+8ρ2)∆θ2. The marginal beneﬁt of delegating a second decision is
Mb(2) = −γ2 + 1
2(1−8ρ2)∆θ2. Hence, if Mb(1) > 0, the total proﬁt increases if dl
1 is delegated
to agent l. Likewise, if Mb(2) > 0, both ﬁrst period projects must be delegated to the agents.
Clearly, Mb(1) ≥ Mb(2), that is the marginal beneﬁt of delegating a ﬁrst project is higher than
the marginal beneﬁt of delegating a second one because the information contained in a second
signal is partially redundant (at least for ρ > 0). Hence, if Mb(1) > 0 > Mb(2), the principal
optimally delegates to only one agent.
Proposition 3 The optimal organization is: centralization for ∆θ2 ≤
2γ2
1+8ρ2, delegation of dl
1




1−8ρ2] and delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 to A and B for ∆θ2 ≥
2γ2
1−8ρ2.
The striking result of this paper is the optimality of limited delegation in a repeated context.
Delegation is limited to the ﬁrst period (Gautier and Paolini, 2007) and across agents. Agents
can be treated asymmetrically within the organization. The principal selects one delegate that
will be responsible for the production of the signal and keeps control over the decisions concerning
the other agent.
The quality of the signal produced by the agent depends on the degree of correlation. Mb(1)
is increasing in ρ: when the information are correlated the value of a unique signal is higher.
Conversely, Mb(2) decreases in ρ : the informational content of the second signal decreases with
the degree of correlation. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal organizational structure as a function
of the correlation parameter. Asymmetric treatment of the agents is more likely when the agents
have correlated information. Note also that in a one period model, there is no learning associated
with delegation and agents will be treated symmetrically.
In this model, we have analyzed a dynamic task allocation problem with externalities and
asymmetric information. An alternative mechanism could be that the agents communicate to








l and this makes the principal
weakly worse-oﬀ. In this case, delegation of a second period decision should be envisaged. As we shall see, if
γ
2 > ∆θ







2 is never an issue in this model.
3the principal and the principal chooses the actions. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that
communication is not perfectly informative. In a message game both agents reveal their private
information to the principal who then takes all decisions if 4γ2 ≤ ∆θ2. Clearly there exists
a parameter set where communication fails and delegation is optimal. This conﬁrms Dessein
(2002) who recognizes that ”Delegation is typically a better instrument to use the local knowledge















Mb(1) > Mb(2) > 0
Mb(1) > 0 > Mb(2)
Figure 1: Optimal organization
A Proof of proposition ??
In a two-players game, IC selects the Riley outcome if there are only two states and if the
payoﬀ function satisﬁes the single crossing condition. To prove proposition ??, we replicate the
argument in this three-players game.
Suppose that agent k truly reveals his private information if he controls dk
1. Then, whatever
the choice of dl
1 by agent l, he will not be able to change the principal’s belief about θk. Hence,
the game played by agent l and the principal is similar to a two-players game. In this game, the
standard sorting condition is satisﬁed; This is suﬃcient to kill all the pooling and the separating
equilibria but the Riley outcome.
Suppose that agent k does not disclose his private information at period one either because
he does not control dk
1 or because he plays a pooling equilibrium. In this case, disclosing the
value of θl changes the principal’s beliefs on both θl and θk. We must then identify the state θi
in which the agent has no incentive to hide his private information (if it exists).
If agent l plays a pooling equilibrium, the second period decisions are: dk
2 = αk + θ1+θ2
2 − γ,
k = A,B. If, in state θi, the agent manages to signal his type, the second period decisions
change to: dl
2 = αl +θi −γ and dk
2 = αk +viiθi +vijθj −γ, i,j = 1,2. We must show that there
exists a state θi ∈ Θ in which the agent has would prefer to inform the principal. Replacing
the decisions in the proﬁt functions, we can show that such a state always exists. Consequently
pooling equilibria are eliminated by IC.
If agent l plays a separating equilibrium, the second period decisions are: dl
2(θi) = αl+θi−γ
and dk
2 = αk + viiθi + vijθj − γ. If, in state θi, the agent deviates, he changes the second period
decisions to: dl
2 = αl+θj−γ and dk
2 = αk+vijθi+viiθj −γ, i,j = 1,2. We must show that there
exists at most one state θi ∈ Θ in which such a deviation is proﬁtable. Replacing the decisions
4in the proﬁt functions, we can show that indeed, deviating cannot be proﬁtable in both states.
Hence, we have our standard sorting conditions and only the LCS survives IC.
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